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During the last decade several emerging markets have experienced twin
currency and banking crises. The blame for these crises has been laid at the
feet of the policies that have been implemented since the late 1980s. Critics
have charged that ﬁnancial liberalization and bank privatization have been
associated with bailout guarantees, and therefore have led to excessive risk
taking and overinvestment that have fueled lending booms, inﬂated asset
prices, and rendered economies prone to crises.
The central theme of this paper is that even if we accept that bailout guar-
antees are the inevitable consequence of ﬁnancial liberalization, it does not
follow that the liberalization policies were doomed to fail. We will argue
that in a world where ﬁrms are credit constrained, bailout guarantees can
be turned into a growth-enhancing vehicle, provided they are accompanied
by the right set of policies. Such policies include those aimed at minimizing
incentive problems, including rules that ensure bailouts are to be granted
only in the event of a systemic crisis and not on an idiosyncratic basis. Also,
an eﬃcient regulatory framework is necessary so that banks will perform
their monitoring function properly, and connected lending will not exist.
The reforms of the late 1980s liberalized trade and ﬁnancial markets in
many emerging markets. These reforms also brought a signiﬁcant reduc-
tion in the role of the state in the economy. Suddenly, the future looked
much brighter than before, and the private sector much smaller than what
was desirable. Unfortunately, legal and judicial reform could not be imple-
mented as easily as the other reforms. As a result, many of the institutions
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a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research.that support the provision of external ﬁnance in developed economies did
not ﬂourish in emerging markets. Large ﬁrms in the tradables sector could
ﬁnance themselves in international markets. However, this option was not
open to the majority of ﬁrms.
The policy problem then became how to better promote the fast devel-
opment of the private sector in an environment where external ﬁnance to a
majority of ﬁrms is constrained by internal funds, and where investment is
too low relative to investment opportunities. One is tempted to say that if
a government had the appropriate information and correct incentives, the
optimal policy would be to transfer resources to those in the population
with better entrepreneurial skills, and to let them make the investment de-
cisions. Of course, we now know that this is wishful thinking. After many
failed experiments of this sort carried out during the last century, we now
know that either governments do not possess the appropriate information,
or they are too inclined to crony capitalism and rampant corruption.
Since direct made-to-measure government transfers are not feasible,
during the 1990s governments had to design second-best policies to foster
the development of the private economy, especially in the nontradables
sector. In many countries the decision was made to implement ﬁnancial
liberalization, and to privatize the banks and allow them to be the means
through which resources would be channeled to the nascent private sector.
A by-product (probably an unintended consequence) of these policies was
the appearance of implicit bailout guarantees. As we mentioned earlier, ex-
cessive risk-taking and lending booms developed.
We will argue that the policies we have alluded to above can be consid-
ered second-best-optimal, in the sense that policymakers took sensible and
calculated risks to promote rapid growth, and were unlucky. Crises were
thus not the inevitable consequences of bad policy but simply bad draws
that did not have to happen. They were the price that had to be paid in or-
der to attain faster growth.1
In course of making this argument, we wish to emphasize ﬁve main
points relating both to policies during a boom, and to policies after a cri-
sis. First, bailout guarantees can be a second-best instrument to promote
investment in emerging economies. Severe enforceability problems make
bank credit practically the only source of external ﬁnance for most ﬁrms,
especially the small ones and those in the nontradables (N) sector. In this
environment many proﬁtable investment projects cannot be undertaken
because agents are credit constrained. Under some conditions, which we
will describe below, bailout guarantees promote investment because they
ease these borrowing constraints and provide an implicit subsidy to con-
strained ﬁrms.
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1. We would like to emphasize that we will not defend some policy measures that simply
mask corruption.It is worth emphasizing that in order to have growth-enhancing eﬀects,
bailout guarantees must be “systemic,” as opposed to “unconditional.”
The latter are granted whenever there is an individual default, like in a de-
posit insurance scheme. In contrast, the former are granted only if a criti-
cal mass of agents defaults. That is, it is essential that authorities can com-
mit not to grant bailout guarantees on an idiosyncratic basis, but only in
case of systemic crisis.
The second main point is that there are two preconditions for systemic
bailout guarantees to have growth-enhancing eﬀects: there must be an eﬃ-
cient regulatory framework in place, and the environment must be “risky”
(but not too risky). We consider each in turn.
An eﬃcient regulatory framework is needed because in the presence of
bailout guarantees it is very important to limit the extent of connected
loans and to prevent fraudulent activities on the part of banks. When these
conditions are satisﬁed systemic bailout guarantees have the advantage of
using the monitoring role of banks. This ensures that the implicit subsidy
will be directed to those ﬁrms with proﬁtable projects. More generally, to
the extent that there is an eﬃcient regulatory framework, systemic bailout
guarantees will not generate the incentive problems that plague direct-
transfer schemes.
A risky environment is necessary because the subsidy implicit in sys-
temic bailout guarantees can be cashed-in only if there exist some states of
the world in which there is a systemic crisis. In the absence of exogenous
shocks that bankrupt many agents, there must be endogenous volatility.
Lending booms and risky dollar debt can generate this endogenous volatil-
ity by making the economy susceptible to self-fulﬁlling crises. In fact, as a
way of allowing risk into the system, dollar debt has the wonderful feature
of being a good coordinating device, as it can be observed by others. It fol-
lows that if prudential regulation is introduced with the goal of minimizing
risk in the banking system, for instance by forbidding N-sector ﬁrms to
borrow in dollars, then the investment-enhancing eﬀect of systemic bailout
guarantees might be blocked.
However, having a risky environment does not mean that a crisis has to
happen during the transition path. In fact, the likelihood of crisis must be
small, or otherwise systemic bailout guarantees might have the unintended
eﬀect of drastically reducing productive investment. If the environment is
too risky, ﬁrms will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest in the ﬁrst place.
In some policy circles it has been maintained that ﬁxed exchange rate
regimes make economies more susceptible to crises, among other things
because they provide fewer incentives for agents to hedge their debts. The
third point we make is that systemic bailout guarantees can induce the
adoption of risky debt structures in ﬁxed as well as in ﬂexible exchange rate
regimes. Guarantees may appear under diﬀerent guises and need not be
explicit. The precise form the bailout takes will depend on the regime. For
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amount of reserves authorities are willing to use in order to defend the cur-
rency. In contrast, in a pure ﬂoating regime the bailout may take the form
of direct transfers to agents.
Should an economy experience a bad draw while following policies to
promote rapid growth, there is a question about how policymakers should
react. This leads us to the fourth point. In the event of a crisis the amount
of nonperforming loans increases dramatically. If the bad loans are recog-
nized, the most likely outcome is that the government will have to take over
the banking system, make a once-and-for-all bailout payment, and incur a
huge ﬁscal cost up front. This will increase government debt and probably
interest rates. On the other hand, if just a small share of nonperforming
loans is recognized, the up-front bailout and ﬁscal cost will be low. How-
ever, this strategy might lead to evergreening and generate perverse incen-
tives. Over time the problem might grow and the credit crunch may last
longer, as the experiences of Japan and Mexico have shown.
Finally, in the aftermath of crises, countries experienced severe credit
crunches. Bailing out lenders and cleaning the balance sheets of banks is
not suﬃcient to reactivate the economy. Since a crisis wipes out a big part
of entrepreneurial wealth, it is necessary to implement policies that permit
ﬁrms to borrow again. Clearly, there are severe incentive problems associ-
ated with direct transfers to ﬁrms. Systemic bailout guarantees are a sec-
ond-best instrument to jump-start the economy. To the extent that author-
ities can commit not to grant bailouts on an idiosyncratic basis and that the
regulatory framework works relatively well, systemic bailout guarantees
will be immune to incentive problems.
In the next section we present a short description of the Mexican expe-
rience. In section 15.3 we present the conceptual framework. Section 15.4,
which is the main part of the paper, analyzes the issues we raised above.
15.2 The Mexican Experience
The experience of Mexico during the 1990s illustrates, in a rather sharp
way, the dilemma faced by policymakers in the aftermath of reform. It also
underlines the importance of distinguishing the diﬀerential access to ex-
ternal ﬁnance of tradables and nontradables sectors.
In the late 1980s Mexico implemented radical trade and ﬁnancial liber-
alization, as well as deregulation and privatization programs. These policy
measures generated the expectation of an extraordinary growth in exports
after a short transition period. After decades of statism, the private sector
was too small and so the relevant policy question was how to promote its
rapid growth (as well as the investment in the infrastructure that would
provide the services and inputs that the tradables (T) sector would need
once the extraordinary future arrived). The decision was made to privatize
428 Aaron TornellFig. 15.1 Boom-bust cycle in Mexico
Sources: IMF (2001) and Banco de México.
Notes:Real credit from the banking system to the private sector (1992  100); real GDP (1992






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)the banks and allow them to be the means through which resources would
be channeled to the nascent private sector.
The expectation of an extraordinary growth in exports, as well as im-
plicit bailout guarantees, generated privatization prices for the banks that
were way above standard multiples-to-book value. As is well known, Mex-
ico experienced a pronounced lending boom and a severe real apprecia-
tion. Between 1992 and 1994, lending from banks to the private sector in-
creased by more than 50 percent in real terms and the real exchange rate
appreciated around 15 percent.
In December 1994, the new administration of President Zedillo an-
nounced a change in the exchange rate regime and engineered a small de-
preciation. Although the precrisis estimates of the real appreciation did
not exceed 20 percent, Mexico experienced a massive real depreciation of
nearly 100 percent. As a result, many ﬁrms were unable to repay their
dollar-denominated debts and the government had to implement a bail-
outprogram, known as the Fobaproa. Current estimates of the Fobaproa’s
costs are around 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).
In the aftermath of the Tequila crisis, real credit from banks to the
private sector collapsed and has remained at a depressed level since then
(see ﬁg. 15.1). This stands in sharp contrast with the fast recovery of both
bank deposits and aggregate real GDP. After a short recession, real GDP
started to increase as early as 1996.
Aggregate GDP performance masks an asymmetric sectorial response
to the crisis. While the T-sector experienced an acceleration of growth
throughout the period, the N-sector experienced a sharp fall and a sluggish
recuperation. This asymmetric response was caused by the fact that the
credit crunch aﬀected mainly small and medium ﬁrms in the N-sector,
while ﬁrms in the T-sector could obtain ﬁnance from international capital
markets. As a result, non-oil exports were not aﬀected by the Tequila cri-
sis. In fact, they increased at a faster rate thanks to the real depreciation
and to the booming U.S. economy.
The contrasting pattern displayed by the T- and N-sectors and the credit
crunch in the aftermath of crisis is not limited to Mexico. Figure 15.2shows
that in several emerging economies, the ratio of nontradables to tradables
production increases before a crisis and declines in the aftermath of crisis.
Figure 15.3shows that typically there is a lending boom before a crisis, and
a credit crunch in the aftermath of a crisis. This pattern is consistent with
the view that the N-sector is more dependent on bank credit than the T-
sector, and is prone to “balance sheet” eﬀects induced by real deprecia-
tions.2
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2. The ﬁgures include seven emerging economies: Argentina and Mexico, which suﬀered a
crisis in 1995; Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, which experienced a crisis in
1997; and Chile, which experienced a crisis in 1982, but did not experience any severe crisis
during the 1990s, and so can be considered as a benchmark.15.3 Conceptual Framework
In a perfectly competitive world several of the policies alluded to in the
introduction are welfare reducing. However, to make an appropriate as-
sessment one needs to take into account the context in which policies were
designed and the imperfections they were supposed to counteract. The
conceptual framework that one uses to evaluate policies should allow for
the relevant imperfections, and explain the basic features of the boom-bust
cycles that characterize emerging economies. In this paper we will use the
model developed by Schneider and Tornell (2000) to make such a policy
evaluation.
To explain some of the stylized facts, third-generation crisis models have
looked to ﬁnancial market imperfections as key fundamentals. The models
are typically based on one of two distortions: either “bad policy,” in the
form of bailout guarantees, or “bad markets,” in the form of an imperfec-
tion that induces balance sheet eﬀects, such as asymmetric information, or
the imperfect enforceability of contracts.3 Schneider and Tornell (2000)
consider an economy that is simultaneously subject to these two distor-
tions: systemic bailout guarantees and the imperfect enforceability of con-
tracts. They also stress the role of the nontradables sector, which is often
overlooked in the debate about the causes of recent crises. They show that
the interaction of the two distortions generates a coherent account of a
complete boom-bust episode.
A simpliﬁed version of this model is presented in section 15.3. Here we
present an overview. Consider an economy with a tradables (T) and a non-
tradables (N) sector. In order to explain the facts it is suﬃcient to consider
a simple setup in which T-sector agents are endowed with T-goods, and
consume both T- and N-goods. Meanwhile, agents in the N-sector demand
T-goods for consumption, and produce nontradables using only nontrad-
ables as inputs according to a linear production technology: qt    It.
Firms in the T-sector can easily obtain ﬁnancing in international capital
markets either because they can pledge their export receivables as collat-
eral, or because they are closely linked to ﬁrms that can secure their debt.
In contrast, ﬁrms in the N-sector must rely more heavily on domestic bank
credit. N-sector ﬁnancing is subject to two distortions: enforceability
problems and bailout guarantees. High enforceability problems imply that
lenders will limit the amount they lend regardless of what the interest rate
is. As a result, N-sector agents might face borrowing constraints in equi-
librium. In the model, like in several ﬁnancial accelerator models, the
amount of credit available to a ﬁrm is determined by the level of internal
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3. See Aghion, Bachetta, and Banerjee (1999); Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999);
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2000); Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1999); Calvo
(1998); Chang and Velasco (1998); Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998); Krugman (1998);
and McKinnon and Pill (1998).funds. If bailout guarantees are introduced, their interaction with enforce-
ability problems will induce agents to issue risky debt, generating endoge-
nous real exchange rate risk.
In order to explain the fact that in emerging markets debt is often de-
nominated in foreign currency on an unhedged basis, we allow N-sector
agents to issue either “risky debt” (denominated in T-goods) or “safe debt”
with no real exchange rate risk.
In order to analyze the eﬀect of each distortion we introduce them one
by one. Thus, consider an economy in which only enforceability problems
are present, as in standard ﬁnancial accelerator models. If investment has
a suﬃciently high rate of return, agents will borrow as much as they can.
As a result the credit multiplier becomes an investment multiplier:
(1) ptIt
s   ms(h)   wt
where wt denotes internal funds (denominated in T-goods) of a represen-
tative N-sector ﬁrm; pt   pt
N/pt
T is the inverse of the real exchange rate;
ms(h) is the investment multiplier which is decreasing in the degree of the
enforceability problem (indexed by 1/h); and It is physical investment by
the N-sector. Although safe debt is more expensive than risky debt, in the
presence of bankruptcy costs issuing safe debt is individually optimal.
Thus, in the absence of exogenous shocks, the economy will not exhibit
susceptibility to meltdowns. Under no circumstances will ﬁrms go bust.
Consider now the second distortion: bailout guarantees. There are two
types of guarantees: unconditional and systemic. The former are granted
whenever there is a default by an individual borrower (e.g., deposit insur-
ance), while the latter are granted only if a critical mass of borrowers goes
bust. Clearly, if all debt were covered by unconditional bailout guarantees,
then the enforceability problem would become irrelevant and borrowing
constraints would not arise in equilibrium. Since a lender would be bailed
out in the case of an idiosyncratic default, the lender has no incentives to
limit the amount of credit extended to an individual borrower. Hence, in
order for bailout guarantees not to neutralize the eﬀect of the enforceabil-
ity problem, and for borrowing constraints to arise in equilibrium, it is nec-
essary that some part of banks’ liabilities be covered only by systemic
bailout guarantees.
Systemic bailout guarantees provide an implicit subsidy that eases bor-
rowing constraints. However, this subsidy can be cashed in only if there are
some states of nature in which a critical mass of borrowers goes bust. In the
absence of exogenous shocks that bankrupt a critical mass of borrowers,
the introduction of systemic bailout guarantees will have an eﬀect only if
there is aggregate endogenous risk. In our economy, this bankruptcy risk
is generated if there exists enough real exchange rate volatility. In this case,
the presence of systemic bailout guarantees induces N-sector agents to is-
sue T-debt. This allows agents to reduce the expected value of debt repay-
436 Aaron Tornellments. This reduction, in turn, permits agents to borrow more at each level
of internal funds. Therefore, at a given point in time, the “investment mul-
tiplier” is greater than that of an economy that features only enforceability
problems (ms). The value of investment by the N-sector is
(2) ptIt   mr(h, F)   wt, ms(h)   mr(h, F),
where F stand for the generosity of the bailout guarantee. We now turn to
the question of what is the mechanism that generates endogenous risk.
15.3.1 Endogenous Real Exchange Rate Volatility
The ﬁrst main result is that the interactionof systemic bailout guarantees
and enforceability problems can generate aggregate endogenous risk. This
is because there is a self-reinforcing mechanism at work. If there is suﬃ-
cient real exchange rate risk, it is individually optimal for an N-sector
agent to issue risky T-debt (i.e., to borrow in foreign currency on a short-
term and unhedged basis). However, if many N-sector agents gamble by
denominating their debt in T-goods, exchange rate risk might be endoge-
nously created, as the economy becomes vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling melt-
downs. If the amount of T-debt is high, a real depreciation can severely
squeeze cash ﬂow, or even bankrupt banks altogether. Since they face bind-
ing borrowing constraints, they then have to curtail lending to the N-
sector. Weak investment demand from the N-sector for its own products in
turn validates the real depreciation. The systemic credit risk created by the
banking system thus induces endogenous exchange rate risk.4
To see why real exchange rate variability can make risky T-debt cheaper
than safe debt, suppose that tomorrow’s real exchange rate can take on two
values: an appreciated value that leaves every ﬁrm solvent, and a depreci-
ated one that makes a majority of N-sector ﬁrms go bust. In the presence
of full bailout guarantees, risk-neutral lenders are willing to fund T-debt at
world interest rates because it will be repaid in full in both states of nature.
It will be repaid either by the borrowers in the good state, or by the bailout
agency in the crisis state. Second, if the probability of crisis is small and real
appreciation in the good state is large, it clearly pays N-sector agents to is-
sue T-debt and gamble with the bailout agency’s money. This is because the
greater the real appreciation, the greater the portion of the debt burden,
measured in terms of nontradables, that is inﬂated away.
To  see under which circumstances the existence of T-debt generates
volatility we turn to the determination of the equilibrium real exchange
rate (1/pt). This price equalizes aggregate demand with the (predeter-
mined) supply of nontradables: D(pt)    It–1. The aggregate demand for
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4. Although there are several ways in which agents can engage in risk taking, risky debt de-
nomination (borrowing in dollars to ﬁnance nontradables activities) is a wonderful “coordi-
nating device.” Since debt denomination is easily observed, agents can implicitly collude to
cash in the subsidy implicit in the bailout guarantee.N-goods has two components: the demand by the T-sector, and the de-
mand by the N-sector for its own goods. Since at a given point in time
supply is given, the key to having multiple equilibria is a backward-bending
aggregate demand curve. This is impossible if N-sector ﬁrms have only N-
debt. In this case, price changes lead to variations in both ﬁrms’ revenues
and their debt payments. In fact, proﬁts (measured in nontradables) are
completely insulated against price movements. The upshot is that as long
as ﬁrms are solvent, demand slopes downward and there is a unique equi-
librium real exchange rate.
Multiple equilibria are possible only if N-sector agents have T-debt. In
this case real exchange rate movements aﬀect revenues, but keep the debt
burden unchanged. Thus, it becomes important to distinguish between in-
solvent and solvent ﬁrms. For real exchange rates more depreciated than a
cutoﬀlevel 1/pt
c, all N-ﬁrms go bankrupt because revenues do not cover the
debt burden. As a result, internal funds collapse. Total demand in this
range is downward sloping. In contrast, for real exchange rates more ap-
preciated than 1/pt
c, a further real appreciation is accompanied by a more
than proportional increase in internal funds. The reason is that revenues
increase while the debt burden remains the same. Equivalently, part of the
debt burden measured in terms of nontradables is “inﬂated away.” Conse-
quently, investment demand increases.
It is apparent that if the balance sheet eﬀect is strong enough to make ag-
gregate demand bend backward, as in ﬁgure 15.4, multiple market-clearing
real exchange rates (and hence self-fulﬁlling “twin crises”) can exist. With
identical fundamentals, in terms of supply and debt, the market may clear
in one of two equilibria. In a “solvent” equilibrium (point B in ﬁg. 15.4),
the price (the reciprocal of the real exchange rate) is high, inﬂating away
enough of ﬁrms’ debt (measured in nontradables) to allow them to bid
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Fig. 15.4 Equilibrium in the nontradables marketaway a large share of output from consumers. In contrast, in the “crisis”
equilibrium of point A, the price is low, allowing the T-sector and bankrupt
N-sector agents with little internal funds to absorb the supply of nontrad-
ables. Whichever of these two points is reached depends on expectations.
Fundamentals determine only whether the environment is fragile enough
to allow two equilibria.
15.3.2 Equilibrium Dynamics
The second main result is that the interaction between systemic bailout
guarantees and enforceability problems not only induces endogenous vol-
atility, but also fuels the lending and investment booms as well as the real
appreciation. This explains the other stylized facts described in the intro-
duction.
As we have seen, systemic bailout guarantees alleviate the “underinvest-
ment” problem. They permit high leverage with debt denominated in T-
goods, and faster credit growth (i.e., mr   ms. As a result, the N-sector
grows faster than if guarantees were absent.
Consider now the interplay between the real appreciation and the lend-
ing boom. Since N-goods are demanded for investment by the N-sector it-
self, both output and the relative price of nontradables increase during the
boom. Furthermore, since debt is denominated in T-goods, a real appreci-
ation (a relative price increase) reduces the debt burden measured in terms
of nontradables. This increases N-sector agents’ cash ﬂow. For constrained
agents, this translates into more lending through a balance sheet eﬀect.
More lending, in turn, permits more investment in N-goods. In order to
close the circle, note that if the investment increase is greater than the in-
crease in output, the real exchange rate must appreciate in order to elimi-
nate the excess demand for nontradables.
An economy can follow a risky or safe equilibrium path depending on
whether ﬁrms’ investment plans lead them to go bust in some states. Along
the lucky path of a risky equilibrium, credit and investment in the N-sector
rise over time while the real exchange rate appreciates. At the same time,
demand for N-goods by the T-sector falls. Thus, we have a drastic version
of the transfer of resources and the asymmetric sectoral pattern that actu-
ally takes place during lending booms. A risky lending-boom equilibrium
features two key observed characteristics of credit: debt denomination is
used to take on real exchange rate risk and leverage is unusually high. The
benchmark is the leverage achieved in a safe equilibrium. The lending
boom develops gradually over time. Since the production technology is
linear, the relevant “adjustment costs” here are due to the contract-
enforceability problem. The N-sector can grow only gradually since it must
wait for internal funds to accumulate.
A self-fulﬁlling crisisoccurs when the bad state of the sunspot is realized
for the ﬁrst time. The result is a real depreciation and widespread bank-
Banks, Bailout Guarantees, and Risky Debt 439ruptcies in the N-sector. This depletes the internal funds of the N-sector.
Thus, its investment drops and can only gradually recover (due to the ﬁ-
nancial adjustment costs mentioned above). At the same time, demand by
the T-sector jumps up. Again, this highlights the asymmetric patterns fol-
lowed by the N-sector and the T-sector.
15.3.3 Necessary Ingredients for Boom-Bust Cycles
A key point of Schneider and Tornell (2000) is that the interactionof con-
tract enforceability problems and bailout guarantees creates the fragility
required for self-fulﬁlling crises. If there were no guarantees, ﬁrms would
not be willing to take on price risk to claim a subsidy. Costly enforceability
of contracts alone would still imply that the N-sector can only grow grad-
ually and balance sheet eﬀects would play a role during the lending boom.
However, there would be no force impetus to makes the boom end in a cri-
sis. Alternatively, if there were only guarantees but no enforceability prob-
lems, then there would not be any balance sheet eﬀects that make demand
backward-bending, a necessary condition for a sunspot to matter.
Lending booms that feature fragility cannot occur in just any economy
with bailout guarantees and enforceability problems. It is also necessary to
have a future increase in the demand of the T-sector for nontradables. Oth-
erwise, the N-sector would not be able to repay the accumulated deﬁcits it
runs during the lending boom. Backward induction then indicates that the
sequence of returns that supports the lending boom would collapse. This
suggests that the boom-bust episodes are more likely to occur during a
transition period (for instance, following a far-reaching reform or a natu-
ral resource discovery).
Even during a transitional period the likelihood of a self-fulﬁlling crisis is
not a free parameter. If crises were not rare events, either borrowing con-
straints would not arise, or they would not be binding in equilibrium if they
did arise. In either case, credit would not be constrained by internal funds
and balance sheet eﬀects would not exist in equilibrium. Clearly, if this
were the case, crises could not occur. If the probability of crises is not small
enough, enforceability problems do not generate borrowing constraints.
In conclusion, the introduction of systemic bailout guarantees into an
otherwise riskless economy can increase the credit and investment multi-
plier. However, this occurs only if the economy becomes fragile to self-
fulﬁlling meltdowns. Systemic bailout guarantees induce agents in the N-
sector to switch from safe to risky debt, generating aggregate real exchange
rate risk.
15.4 Policy Evaluation
An emerging economy is one where the future is much brighter than the
present, but where proﬁtable investment projects cannot be undertaken be-
440 Aaron Tornellcause (1) the private sector is small (i.e., entrepreneurial wealth is low) and
(2) the amount of external ﬁnancing is severely limited, especially for ﬁrms
in the nontradables sector. The reforms of the late 1980s liberalized trade
and ﬁnancial markets in many emerging markets. These reforms also
brought a signiﬁcant reduction in the role of the state in the economy. Sud-
denly, the future looked much brighter than before, and the private sector
much smaller than what was desirable. Unfortunately, legal and judicial re-
form could not be implemented as easily as the other reforms. As a result,
many of the institutions that support the provision of external ﬁnance in
developed economies did not ﬂourish in emerging markets. Firms in the
tradables sector could ﬁnance themselves in international markets. How-
ever, this option was not open to N-sector ﬁrms.
The policy problem then became how to better promote the fast devel-
opment of the private sector in an environment where external ﬁnance to
the nontradables sector is constrained by internal funds of ﬁrms, and
where N-sector investment is too low relative to investment opportunities
(e.g., infrastructure, services, etc.). One is tempted to say that if a govern-
ment had the appropriate information and correct incentives, the optimal
policy would have been to transfer resources to those in the population
with better entrepreneurial skills, and to let them make the investment de-
cisions. Of course, we now know that this is wishful thinking. After many
failed experiments of this sort carried out during the last century, we now
know that either governments do not possess the appropriate information,
or they are too inclined to crony capitalism and rampant corruption.
Since direct made-to-measure government transfers are not feasible,
during the 1990s governments had to design second-best policies to foster
the development of the private economy, especially in the N-sector. In
many countries the decision was made to privatize the banks and allow
them to be the means through which resources would be channeled to the
nascent private sector. The issues described in the introduction should be
analyzed from this perspective.
We will analyze these issues by using the framework described in section
15.3. Since this model explains many of the stylized facts that characterize
the boom-bust cycles experienced by emerging markets during the 1990s,
it is an appropriate framework to evaluate the policies implemented by
emerging markets. We will argue that when taking into consideration the
distortions that exist in emerging markets, there is a sense in which these
policies are second-best-optimal instruments to foster the nontradables sec-
tor’s growth. We would like to distinguish between these policies and those
that are designed to mask corruption. The latter are clearly undefendable.
15.4.1 Policies during a Boom
Consider the two-sector economy described in section 15.3 in which
ﬁrms in the T-sector can easily obtain ﬁnancing in international capital
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bank credit. Furthermore, since emerging markets face acute enforceabil-
ity problems, ﬁrms in the N-sector face severe borrowing constraints that
limit their ability to undertake proﬁtable projects. As a result, the growth
rate of the N-sector is kept below its potential. It follows that a policy-
maker, whose objective is to maximize social welfare, must design second-
best policies that will ease borrowing constraints and increase investment
in the N-sector. Since the N-sector and the T-sector compete for produc-
tive resources and since any policies to support the N-sector have implicit
ﬁscal costs, the optimal support level for the N-sector cannot be arbitrar-
ily large.
We have seen that in the presence of severe enforceability problems in ﬁ-
nancial markets, credit is constrained by internal funds. As a result, prof-
itable investment projects will not be undertaken, especially in the N-
sector. Thus, over the medium-run, growth will be signiﬁcantly lower than
its potential. This indicates that systemic bailout guarantees might actually
play a socially beneﬁcial role. Systemic bailout guarantees provide an im-
plicit subsidy that reduces the cost at which ﬁrms can fund themselves, and
that increases the credit multiplier. This increases investment and growth
at each level of internal funds. In the absence of better instruments to pro-
mote investment and growth of the N-sector, systemic bailout guarantees
are a second-best instrument to make transfers to this sector. We would like
to emphasize that this mechanism uses the information and monitoring ca-
pacity of banks.
Although there are several ways systemic bailouts can be implemented,
for simplicity, consider the generosity of bailout guarantees (F ) as the pol-
icy instrument. An increase in Finduces an increase in the investment mul-
tiplier in equation (2), which in turn leads to a higher growth rate of the N-
sector. Therefore, in an emerging economy it is optimal to set F higher than
zero in order to reduce the underinvestment problem. However, there are
trade-oﬀs: ﬁrst, the greater Fthe greater the contingent ﬁscal cost; and sec-
ond, the greater F, the greater the share of resources allocated to the N-
sector at the expense of the T-sector. Therefore, the level of Fshould not be
set too high. There is an interior optimum.
We would like to emphasize three points. First, systemic bailout guar-
antees do not curtail the discipline faced by either individual banks or
ﬁrms because they are granted only if a critical mass of agents defaults. At
the same time, systemic bailout guarantees generate an investment subsidy
only if the banks’ portfolios are risky, that is, only if there exist states of na-
ture in which there is systemic crisis. In the absence of large exogenous
shocks, guarantees will be eﬀective in promoting investment only if the
banking system generates risk endogenously (we address this issue below).
Second, systemic bailout guarantees imply that the government can credi-
bly commit not to bail out individual agents in the case of idiosyncratic de-
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prone to fraud, systemic bailout guarantees will not be socially beneﬁcial.
The experience of Mexico during the 1990s illustrates, in a rather sharp
manner, the policy dilemma faced by reformers. Several critics have
pointed to the “false rosy expectations” generated by the government, and
the promises of bailout guarantees, as the culprits for the Tequila crisis.
Certainly, in hindsight this is true, a policymaker would say. However, at
that time it seemed a sensible policy. It was a way to avoid low growth and
bottlenecks in the N-sector that would otherwise limit the overall future
growth of the economy. Plus, from a political standpoint the development
of the private sector encouraged by the policy had the added virtue of cre-
ating new power bases that would block attempts by statist groups to go
back to the old ways. It was a way to ensure the continuity of the reforms.
An important issue that we have not discussed yet is unconditional
bailout guarantees, which are granted whenever an individual debtor de-
faults. Deposit insurance is a prime example. If all guarantees were uncon-
ditional, the discipline in the banking system would disappear and guar-
antees would not play the investment-promoting role we described above.
However, if unconditional bailout guarantees are granted to small bank
depositors, they might play a socially beneﬁcial role. This policy avoids
bank runs generated by cascading rumors, but does not impinge negatively
on the market discipline faced by an individual bank because small depos-
itors typically have very little information regarding the bank’s portfolio.
As is the case in the United States, market discipline should be imposed by
noninsured bank debt, the interest rate of which should serve as an indica-
tor of a bank’s health.
The Role of Risky “Dollar” Debt
As mentioned above, systemic bailout guarantees have investment-
enhancing eﬀects only in the presence of risk. In the absence of large ex-
ogenous shocks, some endogenous volatility must be present if the policy
is to be eﬀective. Therefore, outlawing risky dollar debt could undo the in-
vestment-enhancing eﬀects of systemic bailout guarantees. Thus, if the
conditions of a country call for bailouts as a second-best policy to promote
the growth of the private sector, then risky debt (or another way to gener-
ate endogenous volatility) must also be allowed. Of course, this does not
mean that banks should be allowed to have outrageously risky portfolios.
It just means that a naive policy of outlawing risky dollar debt is not cor-
rect from a normative perspective.
Since systemic bailout guarantees can be cashed only in states of the
world in which there is a systemic crisis, systemic bailout guarantees are
eﬀective in increasing investment only if a signiﬁcant part of the economy
is vulnerable to systemic crises. It is only during a systemic meltdown that
the bailout agency makes payments to lenders. Thus, the expected value of
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ity of the bailout. The greater the expected value of the subsidy, the lower
the interest rates that lenders are willing to accept. Clearly, banks’ portfo-
lios cannot be outrageously risky, as the likelihood of crisis must be quite
small in order for the mechanism identiﬁed in this paper to be operative.
Otherwise, ﬁrms would not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to borrow and invest in the
ﬁrst place! Note, however, that small is not the same as zero. In the absence
of major exogenous shocks, the fragility must come from within the sys-
tem. This is precisely the role of risky debt denomination. As we explained
above, if a majority of borrowers have unhedged debt, the economy as a
whole can become vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling crises.
As a way of allowing risk into the economy, dollar debt has the wonder-
ful feature of being a coordinating device, as it can be observed by others.
It plays the same role as the real estate buildup on an uninsured basis in
catastrophe-prone areas. The principle that “if everyone else does it, then
I am safe” reigns.
From a positive perspective it is impossible to outlaw dollar short-term
debt. Many ﬁrms need such debt in order to carry out their international
transactions. Since it is impossible to distinguish what part of dollar debt
is used by a given ﬁrm to ﬁnance international transactions, it is not fea-
sible to enforce a law that forbids dollar debt for uses other than interna-
tional trade. This lesson has been painfully learned by many countries that
have tried to implement dual exchange rates, and then were faced with
rampant mis-invoicing of imports and exports.
In conclusion, the degree of banks’ and ﬁrms’ portfolio riskiness should
be strictly regulated. However, risky debt should not be outlawed alto-
gether. It is neither socially optimal nor practically implementable.
The Role of Lending Booms and Asset Price Inﬂation
During a lending boom credit grows unusually fast and, as many ob-
servers have pointed out, monitoring eﬀectiveness declines. Thus, it is less
likely that unproﬁtable and white elephant projects will be detected and
stopped. At the same time, ﬁrms in emerging markets have a very low level
of external ﬁnance, especially in the N-sector. Thus, a lending boom is a
mechanism by which faster growth can be attained. In fact, the lending
boom is a transitional phase that is ignited by deep economic reforms that
make the future much brighter than the present.
Stopping a lending boom—for example, by increasing reserve require-
ments—would interrupt the policy of promoting the growth of the private
sector. However, allowing the lending boom to continue unchecked in-
creases the debt burden of the economy, which makes it more vulnerable to
crises. Hence, it is not clear ex ante at which point a lending boom should
be stopped.
It is interesting to note that although crises typically are preceded by
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derretche, and Valdes (1999) ﬁnd that for a large panel of countries the
probability that a lending boom ends in a crisis is quite small. That is, in
the majority of cases, lending booms end with soft landings. Furthermore,
theoretically lending booms can develop only if the probability of crisis is
small and they are expected to end with a soft landing if they last long
enough (see Schneider and Tornell 1999).
Clearly, India has not experienced lending booms of such magnitude as
the ones experienced by Korea. Moreover, India has not suﬀered currency
crises as deep as those endured by Korea. Certainly, this does not mean
that over the last half-century the Indian economy has performed better
than Korea’s. Of course, with hindsight, Korean performance could have
been improved on the margin. However, we should beware of ﬁne-tuning
policies designed (ex post) to look great ex post.
Prior to several crises it has been observed that some assets, such as real
estate, experience a steep price inﬂation that is followed by a price collapse
at the time of crisis. Since real estate is used as collateral, there is a close
link between lending and asset price inﬂation during a boom. Thus, im-
plementing policies that would stop asset price inﬂation will also reduce
the growth of credit. Clearly, it might be dangerous to leave asset price in-
ﬂation unchecked. However, some degree of inﬂation might be desirable
as a tool to ease borrowing constraints.5
What Are the Eﬀects of Reforms That Improve the 
Contracting Technology in Financial Markets?
During the last decade several countries privatized their banks, liberal-
ized their ﬁnancial markets, and implemented legal reforms that facilitated
contracts between private agents. Unfortunately, in several cases these re-
forms have lead to an increase in fraud instead of economic growth (see
Tornell 2000). The lack of a concurrent improvement in prudential regula-
tion is often cited as responsible for this lackluster outcome. Given that the
regulatory framework cannot be improved by decree, the question arises as
to whether such reforms should be implemented regardless of the regula-
tory framework.
To address this issue it is important to note that there is a nonlinearity in
the relationship between the degree of contract enforceability and the de-
sirability of ﬁnancial-sector reforms. We will argue that such reforms are
socially beneﬁcial only if contract enforceability is very low, or the reforms
are radical enough so as to eliminate balance sheet eﬀects.
An improvement in the ﬁnancial markets’ contracting technology has
the eﬀect of increasing credit at each level of internal funds. In terms of
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5. Schneider and Tornell (1999) study the interplay between asset prices and lending along
a boom.equations (1) and (2), it means a reduction in the parameter h and an in-
crease in the investment multipliers ms and mr. In the extreme, if contracts
are not enforceable and the legal system is nonfunctional, it will be almost
impossible for creditors and lenders to establish a bilateral debt agreement.
With certainty borrowers will divert funds and default. As a result, credit
to the N-sector will be almost nil, and the economy will not be fragile to
crises. In this environment the introduction of systemic bailout guarantees
would obviously not induce greater investment as suggested in the pre-
vious section. Thus, in these extreme circumstances privatization of the
banking system and reforms that improve the contractual environment are
clearly socially beneﬁcial.
Consider now the other extreme, in which it is possible to implement le-
gal reforms that reduce the enforceability problem to such a level that it is
possible for even small ﬁrms in the N-sector to enter into bilateral agree-
ments with foreign lenders. Clearly, in this extreme case borrowing con-
straints will not be an issue. As a result, ﬁrms could borrow up to the level
determined by proﬁtability and technological conditions. Therefore, it is
socially beneﬁcial to bring the enforceability of contracts to a level where
the majority of domestic ﬁrms and banks do not face borrowing con-
straints. Moreover, if this were the case, there would be no role for systemic
bailout guarantees. Even if they were put in place, they would be irrelevant!
But, what if contract enforceability (h) is at an intermediate level? Would
privatization and ﬁnancial reforms that improve private contracting un-
ambiguously be socially beneﬁcial? The answer is no. A concurrent im-
provement in prudential regulation is essential. Recall that it is not socially
optimal to increase credit to the N-sector indeﬁnitely at the expense of the
T-sector. There is an interior maximum. Taking as given the generosity of
bailouts (F), an improvement in contract enforceability (l/h) eases bor-
rowing constraints and increases the credit multiplier. However, it does not
eliminate borrowing constraints and balance sheet eﬀects altogether. As a
result, such an improvement in private contracting might induce more
fragility than what is socially desirable. Clearly, if one could ﬁne-tune the
generosity of bailout guarantees, one could envision some trade-oﬀ. Un-
fortunately, systemic bailout guarantees are more often than not deter-
mined by political forces. Either you have them or you do not!
Another way of stating this argument is that, after some point, a further
improvement in contract enforcement will only serve to permit borrowers
and lenders to better collude in ripping oﬀ the bailout agency and taxpay-
ers. Instead of enhancing the rate of growth of the economy, it will simply
facilitate the adoption of white elephant investment projects that mask
theft, or might make it easier to design fraudulent lending schemes. If not
accompanied by improvements in the regulatory framework, reforms that
simply improve contractual arrangements marginally might have the unin-
tended eﬀect of fostering crony capitalism.
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Our previous discussion highlights the need to improve prudential regu-
lation concurrently with privatization and ﬁnancial reforms. There are two
levels at which the regulatory body should act. First, it should ensure that
the banking system does not undertake more risk than what is socially de-
sirable. As we discussed in the previous section, a risky debt proﬁle might
be necessary for the subsidy implicit in systemic bailout guarantees to have
the desired eﬀect of increasing credit and investment. However, this does
not mean that anything goes. Appropriate regulation must determine the
ﬁnancial ratios in accordance with the situation of a given country. Blindly
applying the Basel accord requirements does not make sense, as the level of
risk induced might be greater than the one appropriate for the country in
question.
The second level at which the regulatory body should act is in minimiz-
ing the extent of fraudulent schemes and adoption of white elephants. The
more eﬃcient the regulatory agency is in blocking these manifestations of
crony capitalism, the more likely that systemic bailout guarantees will in-
duce fast and sustainable economic growth, and the greater the social pay-
oﬀ associated with reforms that improve contractual enforceability. In the
absence of a strong and independent regulatory agency, it becomes im-
portant to consider whether the ownership of banks should be strictly
separated from ownership of industrial corporations. We will discuss this
below.
Reforms that permit better bilateral private contracting should go hand
in hand with improvements in regulatory capacity. However, it seems that
here lies one of the greatest bottlenecks faced by emerging markets. More
often than not, regulatory agencies fall prey to those they regulate. We now
know that this is a political distortion that cannot be eliminated by decree.
In the case of banks, at the time of privatization a signiﬁcant part of de
facto nonperforming loans are passed on to the new owners. These invis-
ible nonperforming loans reﬂect typically past hidden ﬁscal deﬁcits or po-
litical payoﬀs. At the time of privatization it is politically expedient not to
recognize them, and pass them on to the new owners. This has two impli-
cations. First, the true capitalization of the newly privatized banks is lower
than what the standard ratios indicate. Second, if the privatizers are also
the regulators, there is a strong reason for regulators to oversee some future
malpractices of the banks: bankers help regulators hide some nonper-
forming loans to begin with. Both implications make it more likely that the
recently privatized banking system will engage in excessively risky lending
and even in fraudulent activities.
Even if capture of regulatory agencies is not an issue, one still needs to
worry about regulatory forbearance and evergreening. Regulators have in-
centives to consider the negative shocks that hit banks’ balance sheets as
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to recapitalize. Since banks often fail to do so, authorities must seek ﬁscal
resources to recapitalize banks. Since such actions are politically costly,
it is always better to ignore the problem, at least for the time being. Thus,
with the acquiescence of regulators, banks capitalize the past due interest
of de facto nonperforming loans. These loans now become evergreen ac-
counts. Obviously, this is an explosive situation: the capitalization of banks
will have to be confronted in the future. There are more perverse situa-
tions where evergreen accounts reﬂect political favors to speciﬁc powerful
groups.
The FDICIA law implemented in the United States in 1991 has several
elements that might be eﬀective ways to improve the regulatory framework
in emerging markets (see Kaufman (1997)). This law makes sanctions to
banks mandatory and thus lessens political pressure on regulators. This
law includes a prompt-corrective-action clause according to which a
bank’s problems must be solved before eﬀective capital becomes negative.
Sanctions are applied in stages depending on the level of eﬀective capital.
These sanctions include restrictions on dividend payouts, limits on assets’
growth, and losing management rights. Furthermore, new capital must be
injected by owners before eﬀective capital becomes negative. With these
measures, the resolution of a bank does not imply ﬁscal costs. Interna-
tional organizations could focus much more attention on this area.
The Role of Foreign Banks
During the last decade the share of the domestic banking system owned
by foreigners has increased spectacularly. The accepted wisdom is that for-
eign ownership of banks brings three main beneﬁts to an emerging market.
First, foreign banks improve the banking practice and know-how. Second,
since the size of the private sector in emerging markets is too small, the ex-
istence of foreign banks makes it easier to separate ownership of banks
from ownership of industrial corporations. As we discussed earlier, in the
presence of a weak regulatory framework this separation might reduce the
likelihood of fraudulent schemes between lenders and borrowers.
Third, in case of a systemic crisis, parents of foreign subsidiaries will
inject the resources necessary to withstand a run. Note, however, that in
general foreign subsidiaries are legally separate entities from the parents.
Thus, subsidiaries can declare themselves in bankruptcy during a crisis,
without aﬀecting the parent company. Reputation considerations are fre-
quently invoked to defend the notion that resources would be transferred
by the parent in case of a crisis. This argument is far from obvious because
in case of a systemic crisis all parent banks can refuse to support their sub-
sidiaries (by invoking some sort of force majeure clause), without losing
reputational capital vis-à-vis the other major international banks.
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There are several ways in which systemic bailout guarantees can be im-
plemented. The particulars will of course depend on the exchange rate
regime. A nice feature of Schneider and Tornell’s framework is that the
eﬀects of guarantees and the forces that generate boom-bust cycles are in-
dependent of the exchange rate regime or monetary policy rule. This per-
mits us to study how guarantees aﬀect the economy under diﬀerent regimes.
With fully ﬂexible exchange rates the mechanism is literally the same as
the one we consider in section 15.3. If agents are highly leveraged and have
risky dollar debt, the economy is vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling crises in which
there is a severe real depreciation and several agents in the N-sector suﬀer
from balance sheet eﬀects and are unable to repay their debts. As a result,
creditors get paid a proportion F of the contracted payment. This bailout
payment can be ﬁnanced by an international organization and/or by an
increase in future taxes to the rest of the economy. The real depreciation
can arise by either a nominal depreciation, a change in nominal prices, or
a combination of both.
Consider the other extreme of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. In the case
of an attack the central bank can defend the currency by either running
down reserves or increasing the interest rate. If the attack is successful, the
reduction in reserves constitutes a bailout payment to bank creditors that
withdraw their funds and convert them into foreign currency. Thus, any de-
fense policy has associated with it a bailout rate F. Clearly, the bailout rate
need not be 100 percent, as reserves might not suﬃce to cover all the lia-
bilities of the banking system. We should add that the bailout can be com-
plemented by an explicit transfer, like in Mexico during the Tequila crisis.
Again, the real depreciation can come about through a combination of a
nominal depreciation and a change in nominal prices.
In the real world we observe a mixture of both regimes. However, it
should be clear that the underlying forces are essentially the same in both
cases.
15.4.2 Policy in the Aftermath of Crisis
Bailing Out Borrowers versus Bailing Out Lenders
Once a crisis has erupted and a severe real depreciation has taken place,
the main objective should be to contain the meltdown and to minimize the
number of bankruptcies. This is because ineﬃcient bankruptcy procedures
generate deadweight losses. Productive assets are ineﬃciently liquidated
and human capital networks are destroyed. Furthermore, reputational
capital in credit markets, which takes a long time to build, is destroyed
(Wyne 2000).
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bailing out lenders does not save borrowers from being decapitalized
and suﬀering bankruptcy. Therefore, despite the occurrence of generous
bailouts, credit crunches have developed in the aftermath of crises during
the 1990s. This has been reﬂected in three regularities. First, depositors’
bank runs have seldom been observed in the crises of the 1990s. Second, in
the aftermath of crises the growth rate of bank loans has typically re-
mained below the growth rate of deposits. Since the value of collateral col-
lapses, banks shift their portfolios toward others assets such as government
securities. Third, the interest rate spread has typically remained above its
precrisis level after GDP growth has returned to its trend.
Ex post, extending some type of bailout to borrowers might avoid bank-
ruptcies and ameliorate the credit crunch. This policy, however, might not
be possible to implement because the ﬁscal cost might be enormous. Fur-
thermore, it has perverse incentives eﬀects. First, many borrowers that
have the ability to pay might simply refuse to do so. Since it is extremely
diﬃcult to distinguish liquid and illiquid borrowers during a generalized
crisis, it is basically impossible to implement a borrower-bailout policy
that discriminates among diﬀerent types of borrowers. Second, market
mechanisms might be blocked as borrowers and lenders might delay the
resolution of certain loans.
Piecemeal versus All-at-Once Bailouts
In the aftermath of a crisis the share of nonperforming loans increases
spectacularly. Both regulators and banks have incentives to underreport
the true share of nonperforming loans. This way, bank owners need to in-
ject less capital, and the government needs to spend less ﬁscal resources up
front. In contrast, reporting the true nonperforming loans might force a
takeover of several banks by either the government or other banks. As a re-
sult, bank owners will lose their franchises, and government oﬃcials will
face political criticism for their failure to appropriately regulate the bank-
ing system.
Thus, bankers and regulators have incentives to “believe” that negative
news is more transitory than what it actually is, and to make predictions
about the banks’ portfolios that are more optimistic than what is war-
ranted by the facts. The eﬀect of this misperception is an evergreening of
banks’ balance sheets. That is, there is a tendency for banks to classify as
performing those loans that are actually never going to be repaid, and for
regulators to turn a blind eye to this mistake. The problem with evergreen-
ing is that it generally leads to an increase in the share of nonperforming
loans over time. This is because interest is not repaid, and because banks
have incentives to undertake very risky projects that might have negative
expected net present value. Banks might even have incentives to extend
outright fraudulent loans.
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the ﬁscal cost of the bailout grows over time, and it might even grow faster
than GDP. Second, the credit crunch suﬀered by small nontradables ﬁrms
will be deeper and more persistent, as banks will have more incentives
to engage in risky activities than to lend to ﬁrms with low internal funds
(Krueger and Tornell 2000 analyze the Mexican case).
The alternative policy is to recognize at once all nonperforming loans.
Since it is unlikely that bank shareholders will be able to come up with the
necessary capital, the government will have to take over all the liabilities
of the banking system. This policy implies that government debt must in-
crease by several percentage points of GDP in a single year. This is politi-
cally very costly. However, the evergreening alternative is likely to be so-
cially more costly, as the experiences of Japan and Mexico have shown.
Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Responses to Crises
In the standard Mundell-Fleming model, when there is a capital outﬂow
the needed improvement in the current account can be attained with a real
depreciation and with no output costs. According to this view, a deprecia-
tion induces a shift of resources from the nontradables to the tradables sec-
tor, and makes the economy more competitive in world markets. As a re-
sult, growth resumes quite fast after the depreciation.
The Mundell-Fleming framework and traditional balance-of-payments
crisis models are not appropriate for explaining these new boom-bust
episodes because the banking system plays no essential role in these mod-
els. Once we move into a world in which bank lending is essential, and debt
is denominated in foreign currency, the traditional policy recommendation
becomes invalid. As we have seen, allowing the real exchange rate to de-
preciate in order to close the external gap has perverse eﬀects. Since do-
mestic ﬁrms have dollar-denominated debt but their revenues are denomi-
nated in domestic currency, a real depreciation will make some domestic
ﬁrms unable to repay their debts, and will bankrupt them. This in turn, will
make the problem even worse. Capital ﬂight will increase, the real exchange
rate will depreciate even further, and more ﬁrms will go bust. This vicious
circle will generate a meltdown of the domestic sector of the economy.
In this situation an increase in interest rates might not be such a bad
idea. But does it actually work? It is not clear, whether from an empirical
or a conceptual perspective. In a sample of seventy-ﬁve countries over the
period 1960–1997, Kraay (2000) ﬁnds no evidence that interest rates sys-
tematically increase during failed speculative attacks, nor that raising in-
terest rates increases the probability that an attack fails.
From a conceptual perspective, an interest rate hike is eﬀective in stem-
ming a crisis only if such an increase does not bankrupt a critical mass of
ﬁrms. If a critical mass of ﬁrms goes bust because they are unable to meet
their debt service, then the investment demand will collapse and the real ex-
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tradables. The end result will be the same as the one in the previous para-
graph.
In contrast, if an interest rate hike simply generates a recession but does
not induce generalized bankruptcies, then an immediate crisis might be
avoided. The question then arises as to whether the time of reckoning will
not simply be pushed forward. Will higher domestic interest rates simply
induce foreign investors to exploit arbitrage opportunities during a short
period until central bank reserves are depleted? Will higher domestic in-
terest rates make several ﬁrms insolvent, and lead them to bankruptcy in
the near future? It is necessary that the answers to these questions are in the
negative in order for an interest rate increase to avoid a crisis.
Clearly, the speciﬁc situation of a country will determine what is the cor-
rect mix of exchange rate depreciation and interest rate increase.
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Comment Kyoji Fukao
Although the major part of this paper is based on a theoretical model,
which was originally presented in Schneider and Tornell’s (2000) National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) working paper, the author does
not provide substantial explanation of the model in this paper. I found that
without reading Schneider and Tornell’s working paper, it is very diﬃcult
to understand this paper. I would like to ask the author to add suﬃcient
explanation of the background model to this paper.
Let me explain Schneider and Tornell’s model, ﬁrst. Their model is based
on two basic assumptions.
First, there are bailout guarantees for systemic risk in the nontradable-
goods sector (N-sector). The guarantees make ﬁrms choose risky invest-
ment plans. The guarantees also work as a kind of investment subsidy.
Second, because of contract-enforceability problems, ﬁrms face bor-
rowing constraints. The size of ﬁrms’ investment is constrained by the
amount of their internal funds.
In ﬁnancial theory, we know these two mechanisms very well. But by
combining these two mechanisms and by including several additional as-
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equilibrium model.
The additional assumptions are that ﬁrms borrow foreign currency in
order to make their investment plans risky, and that the real exchange rate
is determined by the equilibrium condition in the nontradable-goods mar-
ket. Multiple equilibria exist in the model. If the domestic currency de-
preciates, ﬁrms in the nontradable-goods sector go bankrupt and invest-
ment demand for nontradable goods declines. In this way a self-fulﬁlling
currency crisis occurs. When there is no crisis, the N-sector will gradually
grow. This is the essential part of Schneider and Tornell’s model.
In this new paper, the author takes the following strategy. He assumes
that Schneider and Tornell’s model is completely correct and derives sev-
eral policy implications from it. His main policy implication is, “The in-
troduction of systemic bailout guarantees can increase the credit and in-
vestment multiplier,” and that it “can be considered second-best-optimal.”
I think that the author’s strategy is not very successful. When we con-
struct a model, we can use bold assumptions in order to simplify the model.
Schneider and Tornell’s paper is excellent. But when we write a paper on
economic policy, we need to be more careful about the underlying as-
sumptions. I wished the author would consider the applicability of the
model to actual economies, providing more evidence.
Let me provide a few examples.
First, it is assumed that international borrowing is used as a device to
create systemic risk by small-sized N-sector ﬁrms. But it is not clear why
ﬁrms do not use other macrovariables to create systemic risk. For example,
in many countries, including Japan, investments in real estate created sys-
temic risk.
Second, even if the probability of the occurrence of a currency crisis is
low, it is too costly for developing economies to intentionally create risk of
currency crisis. There are many other, better policies to enhance the growth
of the N-sector. The ﬁrst-best policy would be to reduce enforcement prob-
lems through raising penalties on diversions. The government can use tax
incentives to promote investment in N-sector, tax T-sector, or subsidize
borrowing by N-sector ﬁrms. I would like to ask the author to show why no
other policy options are available.
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The author observes that banks experiencing losses cut credit lending dur-
ing the economic crisis. Moreover, he notes that the crisis credit crunch
aﬀected small and medium-sized ﬁrms more than it did large ﬁrms. When
banks experience losses, there are two major ways of dealing with them: (1)
market-based approaches and (2) regulatory authority bailouts. Tornell
tries to link bailout policies to an eﬀort to mitigate the credit crunch and
avoid underinvestment by small ﬁrms. He argues that policymakers can in-
duce banks suﬀering losses to lend money to small ﬁrms producing non-
tradable goods by giving them bailout guarantees.
This paper provides a diﬀerent perspective on the currency crisis. Tor-
nell argues that emerging economies pursuing faster growth inevitably risk
currency crises. More details on the relationships among exchange market
ﬂuctuation, credit lending, and growth would improve this argument.
When a crisis occurs, Tornell argues, credit crunching yields diﬀerent
impacts over diﬀerent industries and diﬀerent sectors. His ﬁgures show
that the ratio of nontradables to tradables production falls in many coun-
tries after the crisis. In ﬁgure 15.3, he also shows that the percentage of
bank loans and deposits over gross national product (GDP) changes af-
ter the crisis. More evidence supporting a mechanism by which the credit
crunch directly causes a drop in the ratio of nontradable goods to tradable
goods would improve this argument.
This paper does not suggest a mechanism to ensure that banks receiving
bailout guarantees will lend money to the target ﬁrms. Banks can lend
money to larger ﬁrms rather than small ﬁrms. As banks become more cau-
tious on their lending after the crisis, they are likely to be more concerned
about the credit risk of borrowers. In general, small ﬁrms do not have a
strong credit history, so they often lack credit accessibility. Thus, a mecha-
nism that connects bailout policy and lending to small ﬁrms is necessary.
Tornell argues that an eﬃcient regulatory framework and a reasonably
risky environment are necessary for a successful systematic bailout policy.
There are several other factors to consider regarding the government’s
bailout policy, including (1) adequate ﬁscal means, (2) bailout size, (3)
bailout coverage, and (4) gradual or one-time bailouts. First, does the gov-
ernment or the regulatory authority have suﬃcient ﬁscal means for a sys-
temic bailout? If not, what is the next best option? Second, how much
money should be given in bailout guarantees for banks to lend to small
ﬁrms? Without transparency in bank accounting and a well-functioning
corporate governance system, measuring the magnitude of banks’ losses is
diﬃcult. In Korea, after the government initially bailed out banks with
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Sung Wook Joh is a research fellow at the Korea Development Institute.losses, the banks reported new losses and asked for more money. Third,
should the bailout program be applied selectively to stronger banks or
comprehensively to all banks? In Korea, the government closed down ﬁve
banks and rescued the rest. Would rescuing all the banks have been better?
Fourth, should the bailout occur gradually or at one time? Should the gov-
ernment link improved bank behavior to a gradual bailout?
Incentive problems occur when lenders and borrowers anticipate gov-
ernment bailouts of banks suﬀering losses. Banks may exacerbate losses to
induce government bailouts. Instead of reporting losses early, banks can
wait until the losses become large enough to require the government’s
intervention. Moreover, lenders might allow weak ﬁrms to borrow more
money to provoke a crisis.
In Korea, large business groups (chaebol) are a critical mass of the econ-
omy. The failure of a few chaebol would trigger systemic bailouts. When
chaebolsuﬀered large losses, the government did not want to risk economic
contraction and high unemployment. Thus, the government repeatedly
gave favorable bank loans to chaebolexperiencing losses. Lenders and bor-
rowers then believed that large ﬁrms were too big to fail. Borrowers had an
incentive to increase their size (e.g., through cross-debt payment guaran-
tees, creative accounting, etc.). When these ﬁrms borrowed enough money,
they enjoyed a bailout safety net and no longer needed to pursue proﬁt
maximization to survive.
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